Three case studies were selected that represent the kinds of projects and issues which the Corps is likely to encounter more frequently in the future. One case involves attempts to deal with a significant hazardous and toxic waste problem in constructing a new navigational lock on the Kanawha River in West Virginia. Another case is concerned with attempts to deal with low amounts of oxygen below the Bull Shoals and Norfolk Dams on the White River Basin in Arkansas that threatens a major trout fishery. The third case is about the effort of the Corps to provide services to the Army in planning for the reuse of Fort Ord in Central California.

Each case study examines projects that could provide enough information for a book. However, the guidelines for these cases established a limit of 10 to 12 pages in the interest of the reader and for purposes of economy. Consequently, each case seeks to highlight the major issues, developments, and learning in the case. While the major technical and operational matters in each case are summarized, the focus of the case is on issues and dynamics related to public involvement.

The U. S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) which operates the Winfield Locks through its Huntington, West Virginia, district office began planning efforts to construct an additional lock in 1982. In 1986, authorization was signed by the President for the Corps to proceed with engineering and design and land acquisition activities to construct an additional 110-foot by 800-foot lock at the Winfield Locks and Dam. The Corps schedule for completing construction of the project was 1996, and the estimated cost was $210 million, half of it provided by the Inland Waterways Trust Fund.

In 1987, the Corps initiated efforts to acquire 44 tracts of land totaling 338 acres in order to build the new lock. Among the properties to be acquired was a 22 acre property owned by A.C.F. Industries and used as a rail car service and repair facility. Between 1956 and 1986, A.C.F. maintained and serviced a fleet of up to 47,000 rail cars used for solid and liquid chemicals transport. In 1986, A.C.F. discontinued operations at the site.

On 30 November 1988, the Corps initiated environmental investigations to determine if hazardous and toxic wastes were present on the A.C.F. property. On 1 December the Corps met with company officials to discuss environmental testing. On 5 December the West Virginia Department of Natural Resources (WVDNR), responding to a public complaint, conducted an investigation of the site. On 14 December an initial site reconnaissance of the property was conducted by the Corps. However, follow-up scheduled environmental testing was not conducted because A.C.F. would not allow additional entry or sampling on the property.

In February 1989, the WVDNR conducted an inspection of the site and observed various drums of waste material and areas of the property devoid of vegetation. A.C.F. agreed to sample the drums and designated soil areas. In May, under order from WVDNR, A.C.F. had a study undertaken by Allstates Environmental Services, Inc. which defined areas of soil contamination and identified a number of chemical contaminants. In June, A.C.F. informed the Corps they wanted to clean up the site at their own expense. In October 1989, WVDNR ordered A.C.F. to clean up areas identified as contaminated. On 6 December 1989, WVDNR approved a site work plan to be undertaken by Allstates for A.C.F.. Two days later, the Corps filed a Declaration of Taking in U. S. District Court.

By 11 April 1990, Allstates completed their clean-up work for A.C.F.. On 1 May, the Corps took possession of the property, and on 7 May the WVDNR issued an order stating that A.C.F. had satisfied the requirements of its order of the previous October.

In December 1990, at a meeting with regional E.P.A. officials, it was determined that the Corps as an agency of the Department of Defense, rather than E.P.A., would be responsible for site clean-up because the A.C.F. site had become a federal facility but was not designated on the National Priorities List (NPL). Consequently, it was determined that the Corps would be responsible for site clean-up under the provisions of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) and pursuant to the National Contingency Plan (NCP) regulations (Code of Federal Regulations, 40, Part 300, July 1, 1991).

Throughout 1991, the Corps continued to conduct tests on the A.C.F. site. Successive tests on different sections of the property indicated widespread contamination. By late November, a total site study led to the conclusion that there were 61,000 cubic yards of contaminated soil at the property, including 130 types of organic compounds and 10 forms of dioxins, furans, and metals - "a witch's brew of chemicals," as one West Virginia regulatory official commented. To illustrate the severity and complexity of contamination on the site, one area had in excess of 19,000 parts per billion of dioxin whereas the acceptable E.P.A. level is 2 parts per billion, and there were 140 types of contaminants identified, whereas most super-fund clean-up sites have only two or three.

As the severity of contamination at the A.C.F. site became increasingly clear during 1991, the Corps increased attention to ways of cleaning up the site and informing and involving the public. The protocol in regard to these two needs was framed by federal regulations established by CERCLA. The process required under CERCLA included the following: 1) Maintaining an Administrative Record, copies of which must be made available to the public; 2) preparation of an Engineering Evaluation/Cost Analysis (EE/CA) report that analyzed the nature of contamination, identified alternatives, and proposed preferred actions; 3) Public notice regarding the EE/CA and a 30 day period for written comments from the public; and 4) The preparation of an "Action Memorandum" including a description of proposed actions and a summary of public comments and responses to them.

Public reaction to the Corps' proposal to incinerate contaminated waste on the former A.C.F. site was immediate and strong opposition . Opposition to incineration had previously been suggested in informal conversations between public affairs staff and community leaders. As one environmental leader offered, "we will accept incineration when donkeys fly." In the weeks following publication of the EE/CA, there was widespread concern among citizens and elected officials that the 30 day comment period for public comments on the EE/CA was too short. Citizens signed petitions to extend the date and many wrote letters to the Huntington District office.

The mayor of Eleanor asked the Corps to send representative to a meeting at the Town Hall to discuss the EE/CA on 22 May. Senior officials at the Huntington District advised the District Commander not to attend and instead to send a representative. The rationale for this advice was that the District Commander should wait and make a public presentation at a formal meeting organized by the Corps.

The 22 May meeting was a severe public relations setback for the Corps. As it turned out, 150 people from Eleanor and surrounding communities heard about the meeting and showed up. A Charleston Daily Mail article reporting the meeting was captioned, "Army Corps Credibility Called a Problem." The Charleston Gazette characterized the meeting with a headline, "Residents Criticize Incineration Project." The Corps representative was quoted as saying, "At the very least large amounts of carbon dioxide will be admitted into the atmosphere...But we know of no other way to get rid of it." Among the points made by citizens at this meeting was a lack of trust in an agency that would purchase a piece of property without knowledge of the extent of contamination, a request to extend the period for public written comment beyond 30 days, and proposals for the Corps to explore other methods of disposing of contaminants.

Several days later, on 16 June, Congressman Wise met with the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works, Nancy Dorn, and several Corps officials in Washington. He expressed concern that the Corps was rushing the process of dealing with contamination at the A.C.F. site without public involvement. He proposed the establishment of a citizens advisory committee and asked the Corps to provide a $50,000 grant to provide technical assistance. He then proposed that the Corps and the community might be best served by "bifurcating" the removal and remedial stages of clean-up efforts. He suggested that the Corps could excavate and store the contaminated soil so as to remain on schedule in their work on the new lock. This would also provide more time to evaluate remedial alternatives in cooperation with a citizens advisory group. Secretary Dorn said the Corps was open to considering such an alternative if E.P.A. and WVDNR would also agree. Eventually they did.

On 27 June and 1 July 1992, the Corps sponsored two eight-hour public workshops in Eleanor, each attended by approximately 50 people. The format of these informal meetings included the presence of technical experts on various subjects available at tables set up in the town hall for conversations with the public. Among the experts made available was an E.P.A. consultant expert on incineration. At the July 1 workshop, an EPA representative discussed dechlorination as an alternative to incineration for the treatment of dioxin. While several Corps officials concluded the meetings were beneficial in informing the public, newspaper accounts suggested otherwise. One such account had the headline, "Consultant Recommends Burning Dioxin-Contaminated Soil." The article quoted the consultant to say, "Only incineration will take the dioxin away." The article also included the following quote from a citizen, "This is exactly what we expected from the Corps. There's nobody here to talk about alternatives to burning. All this was set up for was to dispel fears of incineration."

By the 27 June workshop, the West Virginia Citizen Action Group had organized a community group to oppose incineration. The group, called P⋅R⋅O⋅T⋅E⋅C⋅T⋅(People's Response Organization Tackling Environmental Concerns through Teamwork), had representatives at the 27 June workshop who requested, and were given permission to set up a table.

In early July, the Corps extended its deadline for public comments for another 30 days in response to public concern. Meanwhile, P⋅R⋅O⋅T⋅E⋅C⋅T⋅ attempted to sign-up members in the community. On July 18, Congressman Wise held a meeting with 100 residents to discuss the situation at the A.C.F. site. One consequence of the meeting was an agreement to ask the Assistant Secretary of the Army to visit the site. A citizen committee was also organized to evaluate threats to the water supply in Eleanor, since the possible contamination of the water supply was of growing concern among the public.

In October 1992, P⋅R⋅O⋅T⋅E⋅C⋅T⋅ sponsored a public meeting in Eleanor. Approximately 50 people attended. Six representatives from the Corps attended, including the newly assigned District Engineer. A speaker discussed the dangers of toxic wastes and dioxins. According to a Corps summary of the meeting, the audience "stated that they did not resent the Corps efforts and trusted the Corps' position to be closer to the truth than A.C.F.'s."

By early November 1992, Congressman Wise proposed a structure for a Winfield Lock and Dam Advisory Group including the mayors or their representatives from Eleanor and five other surrounding communities, citizens at large from each of the communities, the County Commissioners, four state delegates, three representatives from P⋅R⋅O⋅T⋅E⋅C⋅T⋅, four state representatives, two state senators, a representative from local fire departments, and the Putnam County Emergency Service. On November 9, Congressman Wise sent a letter inviting representatives to join what he referred to as an "umbrella organization" and promised to set up an organizational meeting.

In keeping with CERCLA requirements, in September 1992, the Nashville and Huntington Districts of the Corps published an "Action Memorandum" and on 9 December 1992, it was signed. The Memorandum did not propose incineration as had the earlier EE/CA and instead recommended the "bifurcation" which included removal and storage of the soil and further studies to "thoroughly examine all available technologies." Public reaction the Action Memorandum was positive. In a press release, Congressman Wise commented, "I am most encouraged by the Army Corps' promise to open up a second phase of the clean-up process, to conduct a feasibility study of all methods for final disposal of the hazardous wastes and to allow for additional public involvement in the process."

Following the publication of the Action Memorandum, public unrest regarding the A.C.F. site diminished. The "Umbrella Group" was called together for its first meeting in January 1993. Congressman Wise chaired the initial meeting. Subsequent bi-monthly meetings were chaired by Susan Small of Congressman Wise's Charleston office. The Umbrella Group organized committees to address issues such as citizens' health and safety, emergency response systems, project monitoring, and technology evaluation. Corps representatives attended meetings once a month with the group.

On 24 February 1993, a symposium was held in Huntington, West Virginia, for approximately 100 officials from federal, state, and local agencies and members of the Umbrella Group. Plans were explained for continuing the necessary construction of the new lock while removing and storing contaminated soil as called for in the Action Memorandum. In planning the symposium, some senior officials of the Huntington office argued against including Umbrella Group representatives. However, when the meeting was discussed with staff from Congressman Wise's office, they inferred the Umbrella Group would be included. After considerable disagreement and discussion within the Corps and among all parties, it was decided to include the umbrella group.

On 15 May 1993, the Huntington District of the Corps sponsored a "Partnering Workshop" at the Eleanor Town Hall "to build cooperative relationships, etc." Among the partners were the West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection, the Umbrella Group, Towing Industries, Town of Eleanor, and others. The agenda for the workshop included developing a name, goals, and mission statement for the partnership. While some Corps officials expressed satisfaction with the meeting, several persons outside of the Corps said it was "a waste of time" and "an attempt to create another group." Representatives of the Umbrella Group declined to sign the partnering agreement.

In the summer of 1993, the Umbrella Group elected officers, and a local resident became Chairman of the group. In August, Dames and Moore completed a report on the Preliminary Exposure Scenarios for Potentially Exposed Populations. On 24 August, the Umbrella Group met with Dames and Moore's representatives and suggested several corrections. Reportedly, the consultant said they would not change the report. A member of the Umbrella Group wrote after the meeting: "Their concern appeared to be in defending their report rather than soliciting input from members of the Umbrella Group...We came to the meeting prepared to discuss our concerns, and left thoroughly disillusioned."

The Umbrella Group intends to continue to work closely with the Corps and its consultants in the future. "We don't want to bond with them, but we want a good working relationship," comments a member. "I have found them to be accessible and willing to provide information when asked. And, the Colonel and his staff seem to be making a real effort."

The problems associated with the A.C.F. site increased over time as the Corps recognized the severity of pollution on the site. As public concern increased, the Corps had to devote more attention to public involvement in relation to the A.C.F. site. Consequently, a navigational construction project became a major hazardous and toxic waste clean-up challenge that would cost half as much as the total construction expenses of the new lock. Further, the public involvement challenges escalated from a supportive public to a public that was fearful and distrustful.

The outcome of this case remains to be seen. An interim solution has been achieved by "bi-furcating" the process. For now, the A.C.F. site will be excavated and the polluted soil will be stored until a final solution is agreed upon for its disposal. The new Winfield lock will be built, which was the original goal of the Corps that has always been supported by the community.

A critical question in this case is: should the Corps have purchased the A.C.F. property in the first place? A related and important question is: should the Corps have been more aware and forthcoming about the environmental problems at the site, even if its purchase was unavoidable? Among those interviewed for this case, several reported that the Corps had been informed prior to the purchase of the A.C.F. property of the potential of pollution problems. Further, while the purchase was being completed and shortly thereafter, several Corps employees indicated their concerns about the extent of pollution at the A.C.F. site. It has been reported that their concerns were not adequately considered. "By the internal rigidity exhibited in not listening to environmental concerns voiced by technical staff," one person observed, "we didn't have a prayer in formulating a successful public involvement process in dealing with the HTRW issue."

This case took place during the tenure of three District Engineers. From all reports, each desired strong and open public involvement efforts. The Public Affairs officer provided plans consistent with this approach, and the Project Manager and HTRW manager were eager to comply. Guidance, as reported to have come from the Division and A.S.A. level, to not actively involve the public prior to the EE/CA exacerbated problems with the public. Senior staff guidance to discourage the District Engineer from attending a meeting with the Mayor of Eleanor compounded problems. It was all up-hill from there. Once Congressman Wise joined in, the equation changed. Whether the Corps should have altered its approaches to its planned public meeting and workshops at that point is a good strategic question. Should the Corps have altered its approach or was it capable of so doing?

The visit of Assistant Secretary Nancy Dorn served to convince the public of how seriously the Corps considered this case. Should more have been done to follow-up and should stronger connections have been forged with Congressman Wise as he proceeded to develop the Umbrella Group? Was the partnership workshop necessary and, if so, how might it have been differently planned and structured in relation to the Umbrella Group? What should the Corps have done or do to assure that its contractors relate effectively to the public? These are difficult questions for an organization that has or does face difficult challenges in this case. The Corps should be encouraged that so many of its district personnel remain well regarded. A final question is how to best relate to this situation in balancing centralized and decentralized approaches in dealing with the public?

Case Study #2: The Experience of the White River Dissolved Oxygen Committee

Background

The Corps and SPA did reduce outlet flow and vented turbines in early November. They established an operating target of 4 ppm which was claimed to allow trout to survive while not seriously curtailing hydropower operations. Temporarily, this brought the conflict to an impasse.

On 27 November, then Governor Bill Clinton requested a meeting of Corps officials from the Little Rock District, the SPA, the AGFC, the Arkansas Soil and Water Conservation Commission, the ADPCE, and the ADPT. He requested that representatives of all the agencies establish a committee to develop short and long-term solutions regarding the dissolved oxygen issue. At about the same time, as a result of citizen action by resort owners below Bull Shoals dam, both U. S. Senators from Arkansas also requested the Corps to participate with state agencies to work out a solution. All parties agreed to do so.

Among the elements of the agreement achieved by the Ad Hoc Committee for the 1991 season were the following. The Corps and the U. S. Geological Survey (U S G S ) would monitor the levels of oxygen in the reservoirs and below the dams. The information would be shared through the Corps' online computer program, allowing all agencies to monitor oxygen levels simultaneously. The costs for the monitoring were to be shared. When DO levels fell to 6 ppm the Corps would alert other agencies, recommend reduction in the amount of water release, block open vents on the turbines to add oxygen to the water, and spread the reduced hydropower load over several turbines to increase air intake as well as downstream DO levels. The AGFC would cease stocking trout immediately below the dams during such periods. When the DO level reached 5 ppm, the Corps would calculate when it might reach 4 ppm, requiring a further curtailment in the release of water, so that SPA could notify its customers of a potential reduction in electric generating capacity.

The operational plan to hold turbine releases to a 4 ppm target was implemented successfully between July and December, 1991. There were no major fish kills and operational arrangements between the agencies proceeded as agreed. Meanwhile, explorations of long-term solutions made it clear that the major options would be very difficult and costly. One option was for the Corps to undertake a major study of the White River basin, or at least part of it, to identify alternative remedial actions, their costs and impacts, and make recommendations to Congress, possibly altering policies and procedures for managing reservoirs on the river basin and their outflows. Half of the cost for such a study would have to be borne by the state of Arkansas. A combination of factors, including cost and uncertainty regarding the results, made this option unattractive to the state agencies. The other options included filing legislation with Congress or filing a court suit against the Corps to change policy and procedures. The Corps, not surprisingly, could not be party to such action against itself. The state agencies were reluctant for reasons of cost and their ongoing desire to work with the Little Rock District of the Corps to pursue remedial action. Consequently, attention to long-term solutions was devoted to the exploration of technological options.

During the period of low DO between September and mid-November 1992, water discharges were curtailed and electrical generating capacity was reduced to less than 50% of capacity at Bull Shoals Dam. While no fish kills occurred below Bull Shoals in 1992, a minor kill occurred below Norfork dam on October 24-25 due to low DO levels at night following several hours without any hydropower release. An agreement was quickly reached among all parties to provide additional water releases at night and no further fish kills occurred during 1992.

In early October 1992, many of the members of the Ad Hoc Committee traveled to Knoxville, Tennessee, to learn about efforts by the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) to deal with the DO problem. "The trip was helpful in three respects," commented a participant. "It gave many of us a chance to get to know each other better. It introduced us to some promising technology, and it demonstrated a comprehensive approach undertaken by TVA in dealing with reservoir management issues."

Following the TVA visit, the Corps Little Rock District investigated the possibility of utilizing a technological innovation at Bull Shoals and Norfork dams used at several TVA dams. The technology involved the use of hub baffles on power plant turbines to pull more air into the turbines to increase DO levels. As events occurred, the Corps canceled tests related to the potential use of hub-baffles because the Bull Shoals reservoir was beginning to "turn over" and Corps officials feared the tests would be inconclusive. This event upset a number of Committee members. "Whatever the reasons, this slowed our progress," commented a participant, "and it gave the perception-whether fair or not-that the Corps was dragging its feet or not able to get through its bureaucracy to make a timely decision."

The revised or reformulated committee, while including two new agency representatives, included most of the individuals who had previously represented their agencies. The revised committee identified three study sub-committees that had been developed in the previous two years. An Operations Sub-Committee was responsible for developing an implementation plan for dealing with DO during 1993. A Biological Sub-Committee was responsible for research concerning the biological effects of DO. A Public Affairs Committee was responsible for preparing, reviewing, and coordinating press releases.

In early February 1993, Senator Dale Bumpers asked to meet with Committee representatives to review progress in addressing the DO issue on the White River. The meeting was prompted by a request from resort owners who perceived that sufficient progress was not being made. It was agreed that the Corps would prepare a report in the fall of 1993 describing turbine venting modifications at Bull Shoals and Norfork to increase oxygen below the dams during low DO periods.

Long-term permanent solutions have been more elusive. This is understandable for many reasons. One reason is that the issue of DO is a broader national policy concern, especially in relation to the Corps. The Corps operates hundreds of reservoirs and dams throughout the nation that are exempt from federal Clean Water Act regulations. The dams constructed by the Corps were created in an earlier era for purposes of flood control and energy production. Increasingly, for several decades, public interest has grown in recreational amenities provided by the reservoirs and dam tailwaters. While the Corps has attempted to come to grips with these changes and competing demands, neither Congress nor successive administrations have provided clear policy guidelines regarding these matters. While the Corps, and each of the districts, attempt to accommodate the growth in recreational interests, it has no clear mandate or particular guidance.

Because of this situation, the Corps was cautious in this case. It was cautious in proceeding in regard to potential costs and in regard to establishing a precedent. It was cautious because of the need to ascertain damage or accelerated wear that turbine venting might have on turbine equipment. It was also cautious because of a potential law suit from the State of Arkansas, which has remained as a threat throughout the process and is illustrated by the fact that the Arkansas Department of Pollution Control and Ecology, which originally filed a legal action against the Corps, was never willing to be a signatory for the three annual agreements developed by the interagency committee.

The dilemma for the Corps, in regard to these long-term considerations, is poignantly reflected in the following statement included in the 1993 plan of the Committee: "It is recognized there are legal and technical considerations for each agency that go beyond the goals of the short term action plan for 1993. The participation by an agency representative in the development of the 1993 plan does not preclude that agency from pursuing any action deemed appropriate relative to its long term needs and goals."

This case illustrates that strong participatory practices that require collaboration are not easy to achieve. They require time, willingness to take risks, and the capacity to change. This is not altogether easy for the Corps because it is a large and complex organization that must balance the interests of multiple constituents and is bound by both congressional authorizations and administrative oversight. Further, the Corps itself at the District, Division, and Headquarters levels experiences tensions among those assigned to serve planning, engineering, operational, legal, regulatory and public affairs interests. These factors make it more difficult for the Corps to change and respond in a timely manner to matters that they do not consider to be an emergency. Yet, as this case illustrates, the Corps is willing and capable of responding to a critical public concern in concert with others and with effectiveness. While the Corps response time may make this task more difficult, as their reputation promises, they can get the job done.

Several questions arise from this case. In retrospect, could the White River Coordinating Committee, in existence since the 1980s, have been used more effectively to place an issue such as the DO problem on the agenda of the Little Rock District? In the process of this case, could the Corps have done anything more, or have done it differently? The case seems to be a success story, could it have been a success with greater impact? In prospect, what should the Corps do in regard to its corporate strategy to address the DO issue throughout the nation and in addressing the growing recreational interests associated with the reservoirs it operates, without breaking its covenant to the original flood control and power customers?

Case Study #3: The Fort Ord Reuse Case

Background

Fort Ord (the Fort) is a large Army base located in Northern Monterey County, California, adjacent to the Pacific Ocean. The Fort is 44 square miles in size and is bordered by five small cities (Del Rey Oaks, Marina, Monterey, Sand City, and Seaside). Other cities in close proximity to Fort Ord are Pacific Grove and Salinas.

Established in 1917, Fort Ord has been the headquarters for the Army's 7th Light Infantry Division. Over 17,000 military personnel and 5,000 civilians were employed at the Fort in 1992.

Fort Ord has three major developed areas. The Main Garrison is the major housing, administrative and support area for the installation. It includes office buildings, a commissary, a hospital, troop areas, executive housing and schools, as well as recreational and training facilities. The East Garrison includes barracks, storage and repair facilities. The Fritzche Army Airfield was an airfield and light industrial complex with storage and maintenance facilities for aircraft.

In 1990, two important federal government policy decisions were made regarding Fort Ord. The Defense Department announced plans to reduce military activities and personnel at the Fort. The EPA also declared the Fort as a Superfund site and put it on the National Priorities List (NPL) to receive funds for hazardous waste clean-up.

In February 1990, Congressman Leon Panetta sponsored a meeting of local leaders to oppose the reduction in force of Fort Ord. A Task Force of elected and government officials, as well as concerned citizens was formed. Within six weeks the Task Force prepared a report arguing that "downsizing" or closing Fort Ord was an unwise plan in terms of defense interests and it would have a terrible economic impact on surrounding communities.

The efforts of the Task Force, Congressman Panetta, and others to save Fort Ord from being closed down as a major military installation were to no avail. By April 1991, over 100 military installations throughout the country, including Fort Ord, were identified for downsizing or closure. The Defense Department's plans for Fort Ord included moving its infantry operations (the 7th Infantry unit) to Fort Lewis in Washington State, retaining a few military-related functions within of the property, and turning over the majority of the land to the community to be used for purposes the community would determine.

Following the decision of the Defense Department, the Task Force redirected its energies to prepare for the eventual closing of Ft. Ord. Accordingly, Advisory Committees were organized to address considerations concerning Economic Development, Education, Health and Human Services, Housing, Land Use, Pollution clean-up, utilities, and infrastructure.

By June 1992, the Fort Ord Community Task Force, which involved over 350 citizen volunteers, had prepared a 760 page report. It was called a "strategy" report because the Task Force members acknowledged that their efforts were advisory in nature and that final decisions regard the disposition and future use of Ft. Ord would rest in the hands of the Defense Department and elected officials at the state and local levels. The "strategy" of the Task Force was to create "A statement of community consensus regarding the reuse and development of Fort Ord to include a series of prioritized alternatives."

After the Defense Department announced its final decision to close Fort Ord in 1991, the Corps again was asked by the Army to conduct an E. I. S. The Corps' client was with Forces Command (FORSCOM) in Atlanta. FORSCOM, one of the major commands of the Army, is responsible for active duty troop units in the Untied States. Among its responsibilities is overseeing base realignments and closures of bases under its jurisdiction. The Sacramento District Office of the Corps has been responsible to FORSCOM as well as to the Fort Ord Garrison Command, and to the Headquarters of the Corps and the Department of the Army in Washington, D. C. for various assignments relating to realignment and closure. FORSCOM has been responsible for the closure of Ft. Ord.

An E. I. S. of the scope required for Fort Ord would normally require approximately 2 1/2 to 3 years to complete. However, in a rider Congressman Panetta had added to a Congressional bill, Congress directed the Corps to complete the E. I. S. in 18 months and to address social and economic impacts as well as environmental impacts.

In February 1992, the Corps published its notice of intent to conduct an E. I. S. and in March 1992, a public scoping meeting was held. Shortly thereafter the Corps proceeded as quickly as possible to conduct an E. I. S. on an accelerated schedule in order to meet its mandate of completing it within 18 months.

The Function of the E. I. S. was to determine the impacts on the economic, physical, and social environment according to alternative plans for the disposal and reuse of Fort Ord. When the Corps began to work on the E. I. S. in April 1992, the Task Force of community leaders was still completing their report which was completed in June 1992.

The history of relations between the Corps and the Task Force until this time was marked by tension. Many community leaders opposed earlier efforts by the Corps to conduct an E. I. S. and viewed the Corps as one of the agencies of the Army that posed economic and social threats to the community in closing and realigning Fort Ord.

In June 1992, the Task Force completed its strategy report. This report was reviewed and described as one of the alternatives in the E. I. S. In December 1992, the Corps released a draft of the E. I. S. prepared for FORSCOM by the consulting firm it had retained, Jones and Stokes. Nearly 800 copies of the E. I. S. were disseminated. At the time the draft E. I. S. was distributed, it was announced that a public hearing would be held on 11 February 1993, and a comment period would run until 22 February 1993. The objective of the Corps, at that time, was to receive public input to be considered in revising the E. I. S. so that the final E. I. S. could be completed within the 18 month schedule and a record of decision (ROD) could be achieved by August 1993.

On 11 February 1993, a public hearing was held in Monterey to receive comments on the E. I. S. The hearing which was announced in the local media was attended by 66 people, of whom 23 made comments. By the end of the comment period on 22 February 1993, 64 letters of comment were in receipt from organizations and interested citizens.

In March 1993, FORG published a 114 page Initial Base Reuse Plan. A preliminary draft of the plan had been shared with the Corps and other Army entities in December 1992. Between December 1992 and 15 February 1993, the preliminary plan was reviewed by many citizen groups. Revisions were made and between 2 March and 16 March 1993, the five cities and Monterey County which sponsor FORG, approved the plan as a point of departure to develop a reuse plan.

In July of 1993, President Clinton issued a five point Plan for Revitalizing Base Closure Communities. The plan had the two-fold effect of supporting and accelerated process while assuring community leadership in the planning process. The practical impact of this plan was to strengthen the leadership responsibility of FORG and to promote a cooperative ethos between the Army, the Corps, and FORG.

In June 1993, the Army released the E. I. S. for the Disposal and reuse of Fort Ord. The E. I. S. proposed establishing a 1,500 acre Presidio of Monterey (POM) annex to support military services remaining in the area, a 12 acre complex to support Army reserve activities, and to dispose of the remaining property. All but approximately 3,000 acres of the property to be disposed would go to federal and local agencies in support of their programs at little or no cost.

The E. I. S. examined six reuse alternatives for Fort Ord and 3 sub-alternatives. The alternatives ranged from high-intensity mixed use to low-intensity mixed use to open space preservation. The E. I. S. included a preferred Alternative 6R. Anticipated Reuse (Revised), which included the establishment of the POM, an Army reserve center, and turning over approximately 23,500 acres to a variety of local, state, and federal agencies that had been identified through the real estate screening process. An additional 3,000 acres would be "disposed to private entities without the Army determining future use." The preferred alternative would provide for developing approximately 14% of undeveloped land and a corresponding buildout population of about 22,800. This contrasted to a high-density proposal from some local entities to develop 65% of the undeveloped land for a buildout population of 250,000.

On 23 December 1993, the Army released the Record of Decision (ROD) concerning Ft. Ord. The ROD reflected a compromise between the Army's desire to dispose of property as quickly as possible while allowing surrounding and nearby communities time to complete their reuse plan. In announcing the ROD, Michael W. Owen, Acting Assistant Secretary of the Army said the following: "Because the local communities' reuse plan has not been finalized, the Army does not adopt a specific plan in this ROD"

In February 1990, the U. S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) placed Fort Ord on the National Priorities List as a Superfund site because of the threat of groundwater contamination and other environmental problems. A Federal Facilities Agreement (FFA) was developed with appropriate federal and state agencies under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). Under this agreement, remediation efforts were directed to address soil and groundwater contamination on multiple sites at Fort Ord including: three landfill areas, two vehicle maintenance facilities, a used equipment cannibalization areas, two fire drill areas, and 14 other areas of potential concern.

The Corps was given responsibility by Fort Ord to manage the clean-up process under CERCLA. The Sacramento District of the Corps retained the firm of Harding, Lawson, and Associates to manage the clean-up, including public involvement activities.

The Community Relations Plan developed by Harding, Lawson and Associates in compliance with CERCLA has included the following: a Community Relations Coordinator has managed and overseen public involvement activities; information repositories have been established at the Fort Ord Post Library and Seaside Branch Library; and public meetings and comment periods have been made available in regard to each clean-up activity.

One of the most exemplary features of this public involvement effort has been the creation of a series of fact sheets and information papers. They are very clear and understandable to the average citizen because of their style, the use of graphics, layout, and photographs. The public involvement effort has also included active efforts to communicate with the press and the establishment of a Technical Review Committee to review documents and evaluate progress. The Committee includes representatives of appropriate local, state, and federal agencies. The presence of public involvement staff, on site, working on a day to day basis with base officials, has proven to be successful in connecting the efforts of consultants with Army staff at Fort Ord.

The conflicts and tensions regarding reuse are understandable. The closing of a major military installation like Fort Ord impacts the community with a triple "whammy." First, the decision is a profound economic and emotional shock to the community. Second, planning for reuse draws out competing community values and visions for the future use of the property that must be resolved. Third, the communities and their leaders must work with some of the most complex bureaucracies in the nation ( e.g. Army, E.P.A., et. al.) and a host of complicated regulations.

From the perspective of the Army and the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers, the experience in preparing for the reuse of Ft. Ord has been made more complicated by the imposition of a 18 month schedule mandate for preparing an E. I. S. The development of simultaneous reuse plans, the Army's E. I. S. and the FORG Initial Reuse Plan, was less than a desirable situation in regard to economy of effort and public involvement. While the Corps completed its E. I. S. on schedule, its proposed ROD was delayed four months, and the final ROD turned out to be a study with a recommendation rather than a plan. At the same time, the community had not agreed on a final plan at the time of the ROD. Nonetheless, beyond earlier conflicts, the Corps, the Army, and FORG strengthened their relationships and by the time of the ROD established a relatively strong partnering arrangement. It remains to be seen what the final outcome of planning and implementation for the reuse of Fort Ord will be. At the same time, it is not inappropriate to consider how much more might have been achieved in the same amount of time if the Army, the Corps, and the community had established a strong partnering relationship from the outset.

By way of additional perspective, there were a number of other dynamics that complicated this case. One was that federal government and Army policy changed during the process. Initially, the policy was to close or dispose of property as quickly as possible, under the Army's military commands, and to sell some real estate to make money to cover the cost of environmental clean-up. This policy changed under a new administration when President Clinton issued his five point program stressing a community oriented planning process.

Another significant dynamic was disagreement among local communities. The communities of Seaside and Marina, for example, preferred a more intensive level of development, but this was not consistent with the preferences of other communities. Whereas, the Community Task Force developed a relatively low-density community strategy plan, FORG initially proposed a plan of more intensive development. Some communities liked the FORG plan, while others felt it was unrealistic in not dealing with the environmental and physical constraints identified by the Task Force and by the Army. The Corps was asked to write a report challenging the original FORG plan. This increased tensions between the Corps and FORG. However, as a result of many meetings and communications between October 1992 and December 1993, FORG revised elements of their plan to consider environmental and physical limitations. FORG also participated in developing a hybrid disposal/reuse plan that was attached to the ROD.

The second lesson in the Fort Ord Case, which is also evident in the other cases undertaken in this project, is how much public involvement can be influenced by political dynamics. The political dynamics in this case ranged from differences among local communities to substantial changes in national policy. This case was about more than an E. I. S. It was also about local differences between economic development and environmental values, and it was about the extent of community influence versus that of the Army in base reuse and closure decisions.

The Corps is not immune from cases such as this that are politically charged and complex. It is more rather than less likely that the Corps will need to deal with strong and complex political dynamics associated with future projects. These dynamics influence public involvement practice. How can the Corps best plan public involvement initiatives in relation to political dynamics that shape and influence each initiative? Do most project managers have the skills to relate effectively to influential political forces, and if not, what must the Corps do to promote greater sophistication among managers to do so? Finally, what must the Corps do to adequately manage politically charged cases between the district, division, and headquarters levels?