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Topics: Religion

Organizing Communities: The Christian Right and School Reform

Wendy Togneri
Heller Graduate School, Brandeis University, 1996
Reprinted with permission of the author.

Contents

NOTE: The terms Christian Right, Religious Right, the Right, and Christian activists will be used interchangeably throughout this paper to refer to the individual and collection of conservative citizens fighting against education reform. The term education reform will be used throughout the paper to refer to a variety of curricular and instructional educational agendas opposed by Christian activists including critical thinking, team teaching, sex and AIDS education programs, and others.

Introduction

In the fall of 1992 education leaders in Gastonia, North Carolina were elated. They had recently received word that their community was one of eleven communities across the country to receive the multi-million dollar New American Schools Development Corporation grant—a program designed to finance sweeping reform efforts in the schools. The school board was set to approve the policy changes needed to launch the reform program, and the Gastonia education leadership believed that all was in place to put "The Odyssey Project" in motion. What school officials hadn't anticipated, however, was the outcry that was to come in opposition to the plan. In a matter of weeks upon hearing of the imminent structural and curricular changes, a conservative Christian-based organization had rallied parents in opposition to the plan. Within months, intensive reform efforts were in danger of being foiled (Somerfield 1993).

Two years prior to the events in Gastonia, Christian activism surfaced in the conservative community of Lake County, Florida. In this case, activists targeted the Lake County school board. The leader of the effort was Pat Hart, Christian activist turned school board candidate. Backed by a national Christian women's organization, Hart campaigned hardest in churches, but not on religious issues. Instead she focused on school safety and restoration of basic skills. The close of the 1990 elections revealed that Hart was victorious by only 12 votes. As a minority on a five member board, Hart's first two years were met by frustration and defeat. As a result, she turned to several national Christian groups for support. Hart's active involvement in these Christian organizations afforded her not only political training and education on issues, but it also garnered Lake County political support. As such, when the 1992 elections rolled around, the national Christian organizations helped two additional Christian candidates win election to the board. Given a new conservative majority on the board, Hart was elected chairwoman by a 3-2 margin. This margin foreshadowed the first of many votes to be so decided (Martin 1996; Deigmueller 1994).

Although these two stories refer to events in small southern communities, this phenomena is not at all unique to the South. Similar examples of Christian activism can be found in urban areas such as Boise and San Diego or at the state level in Indiana, Texas, and Pennsylvania. In towns, counties, and states across the country the Christian Right is opposing the efforts of education reformers to infuse new curriculum and teaching strategies into schools. The Religious Right is also targeting seats on local school boards. In 1996 alone, over 44 states were impacted by 475 Christian Right challenges (American School Board Journal 1993; Nasman 1993).

Some educators and citizens dismiss Christian activists as far-right radicals who are unrepresentative of the population. However, through a variety of effective political strategies the messages of the Christian Right are making an impact on many Christian and non-Christian citizens. On the national level, it is unclear as to the full impact of the Christian Right agenda. But in certain states and communities throughout the country, Christian Right activists and their organizations have made significant inroads in derailing education reform efforts and infusing their own agenda (Meachem 1993; Kaplan 1994).

This paper will first examine the organizations and people that make up this powerful force of Christian activists. It will then explore the organizational and political strategies employed by Christian activists to foil education reform efforts and to bring a Christian-based agenda to the forefront of education policy and practice. As a third step, the paper will analyze lessons to be drawn from Christian Right strategies. Finally, the paper will examine the success of parents and education reformers in combating the Right.

1980s An Era of Problems and Rebirth: Getting into the Neighborhoods

A specific structure for the Christian Right emerged in the late 1970s with the incorporation of several national organizations. This structure saw dynamic change throughout the decade of the 1980s and into the 1990s. Moen (1992) notes, "The 1980s was a time of sweeping changes for the Christian Right. Most of the groups that inaugurated the decade did not finish it" (p. 84). He notes further that the 1990s ushered in a new and revitalized period for the movement.

In 1979, the Christian Right became a recognizable player in the political arena with the rise of four primary organizations: the Moral Majority, the National Christian Action Council (NCAC), the Christian Voice, and the Religious Roundtable. The Moral Majority, led by the nationally prominent televangelist Jerry Falwell, was to become the most well-known and controversial of the founding organizations until its demise in the mid 1980s. However, the Moral Majority was not alone in its swift rise and its rapid unraveling. Other organizations born in the late seventies, including the Religious Roundtable and the NCAC, suffered stagnation and folded by the end of the decade (Moen 1992; Liebman and Wuthnow 1983).

The demise of these organizations in this initial period of the contemporary Christian Right is widely attributed to the lack of political and organizational sophistication of the movement (Kaplan 1994; Jones 1993). Moen (1992) notes, "They built their organizations on direct-mail solicitation, on nationally prominent issues such as contra-aid and abortion. In the short-run the tactic proved effective and lucrative. Over the long term it became impossible to sustain people's interest through direct mail on national issues" (p. 27).

Thus, with its pillar organizations in shambles, Christian Right leaders recognized in the mid 1980s that significant reorganization was in order. The reasons for the demise of the Moral Majority and its sister organizations were beginning to be understood and new groups and their leaders stepped up to take the reigns of the movement. Pat Robertson—televangelist, founder of the new umbrella organization the Christian Coalition, and soon to be presidential candidate—began assuming a higher profile while Falwell's influence decreased dramatically in the wake of scandal. In addition, a series of lesser known young leaders of smaller organizations joined the elite leadership circle of the Christian Right. These politically adept newcomers steadily supplanted the "old guard" and brought with them political sophistication (Moen 1992; Bradley 1992).

This new circle of leaders recognized collectively that to have impact on public policy, it was necessary to turn away from the national Congress/White House centered efforts of its early years and focus on issues of specific importance to local communities. What has emerged in the 1990s is what several scholars speculate to be a new Religious Right—one that is led by a collection of national organizations and reinforced by an army of local groups doing the front line work. What's more, an unspoken "division of labor" has emerged among the organizations each with its own niche. Some organizations focus on children's issues, others on right-to-life, education issues, and the like (Kaplan 1994; Arocha 1993; Moen 1992).

Who are the Religious Right?

According to some analysts, educators and politicians often mistakenly dismiss Christian activists as uneducated, crazies who "are easy to command" (Meachem 1993, p. 43). Kaplan points out that, "Today's Christian Right is no ragtag mob of bumpkins, weirdoes, and snake handlers . . Christian Right adherents view themselves as hardworking, taxpaying, law-abiding—if somewhat misunderstood—citizens. . ." (Kaplan 1994, p. K2). Moreover, while not all Christians would consider themselves front-line activists, statistics show that a high percentage of Americans identify themselves in some way with the Christian faith. In fact, a University of Chicago poll shows that one-third of all Americans "are affiliated with an evangelical denomination, believe the Bible to be inerrant, or consider themselves to be born again" (Kaplan 1994, p. K2). What these numbers suggest is that Christian activists can find fertile ground across the country for cultivating support for their messages. As will be illustrated later in the paper, these characteristics are critical in understanding why political strategies of the front-line activists have enjoyed such success.

What has made the Christian Right even more powerful is that its members are not aligned simply by similar beliefs, but rather by a sophisticated network of national and local organizations. The most well-known of the organizations include the Christian Coalition, Citizens for Excellence in Education (CEE), Christian Women For America (CWA), Focus on the Family, the Traditional Values Coalition, and the Eagle Forum. These organizations share several common characteristics. At a national level, they are headed by forceful, commanding leaders with national presence, including James Dobson of the Focus on the Family; Pat Robertson, president and Ralph Reed, executive director of the Christian Coalition; Phyllis Schlafly, executive director of the Eagle Forum; and the Rev. Robert Simonds of CEE. While not all are household names, they command significant presence and response in important local and national circles, most notably among Republican party elites (Hunt 1995). They are also rooted in a strong belief that the country has strayed from its moral grounding and needs new and better public policy to steer it back on course. Finally, they have large, firmly established outreach mechanisms to the masses—strong national bases with significant local presence (Moen 1992; Bradley 1992; Arocha 1993).

The organization most focused and perhaps omnipresent in conservative education policy is the California-based, Citizens for Excellence in Education. Led by Rev. Simonds, the group has a relatively small annual budget and relies heavily on its local chapters to make an impact on the schools. With over 1,000 local chapters across the country, CEE claims to have 200,000 active parents and more than one million 'stand-by parents' working on a variety of educational directives. In addition, almost 1,000 churches are affiliated with its local chapters. CEE also publishes a bi-monthly newsletter and produces a variety of materials to assist its chapters (Arocha 1993; Simonds 1993).

Christian Women for America (CWA) based in Washington boasts over 1,200 chapters nationally and operates on a $10 million annual budget. While the organization focuses on a spectrum of issues, it is highly active in opposing a wide variety of issues in the public schools. It is also perhaps the most heavily grassroots-based of the organizations. The outgrowth of women's bible groups, it places significant emphasis on bringing women together in small neighborhood meetings to address highly specific and localized issues. In addition, CWA uses a small number of Christian radio networks to inform local communities about important emerging issues (Moen 1992; Arocha 1993).

The Christian Coalition, the youngest of the major Christian Right organizations, has quickly risen to prominence. Founded in 1989, it positions itself as an umbrella organization to the movement and plays one of the highest profile roles in the Christian Right's work to oppose education reform policy in public schools. Its main goal is to get "Christian candidates" elected to school boards nationwide. In addition to assisting local candidates, the organization runs leadership schools in most states to train potential candidates. The organization operates on a $10 million budget and includes over 700 local chapters (Arocha 1993; Reed 1993).

Thus, the Christian Right is comprised of a core of highly committed activists and large numbers of less active but philosophically aligned Christian parents, who are bolstered by highly organized special interest groups (Moen 1992; Kaplan 1994; Bradley 1993).

Targets of the Religious Right

What has enabled the Christian Right to compile such an impressive stockpile of accomplishments? To best understand the strategies and tactics of Christian Right groups, it is useful first to look at what they are attempting to influence and secondly, to explore how they are doing it.

What are they influencing?

Influencing local elections: Local school board races have become one of the most important new battlegrounds for the Christian Right. The emphasis on winning low-level elected office became a deliberate focus of the Christian Right in the 1990s. Leaders of the movement recognized school board elections as important policy levers and potentially easy targets for victory. Such elections were seen as attainable goals because they draw small turnouts at the ballot box and garner limited attention from the media. As such, the Christian Right recognized that it needed not to influence a majority of voters but rather rally an active minority to the polls. Most importantly, the Christian Right leadership understood that access to the school boards often meant control over personnel decisions, curriculum decisions, and substantial impact on a district's overall philosophy or vision. Notes Arocha (1993), "The major strategy in this battle within public education is to infiltrate school boards because school boards can most powerfully influence the direction of the public schools" (p. 9).

According to People for the American Way, a national watchdog organization that tracks the activities of the right wing, Christian Right organizations are achieving success in their efforts. Nationally approximately 40 percent of the Christian candidates running under the umbrella of Christian Coalition and CEE support have claimed victory. In San Diego County in 1990, 18 of 29 Christian candidates were elected to serve on boards. While the precise number of Christian school board officials is difficult to pin down, CEE estimates that in the last five years close to 5,000 conservative Christians have won school board elections across the country. Although Christian activists still represent less than ten percent of the total number of school board members nationwide, their recent victories are particularly significant in districts, such as Ventura, California, where the school board is controlled by a majority of Christian activists (Arocha 1993; Kaplan 1994; Simonds 1993/94).

Influencing Policy: Christian activists have also focused their efforts on influencing education policy directly. They have sponsored legislation to advance their own agendas and opposed legislative and local policy efforts of education reformers. For instance, as educators advocate reforms for school curriculum, instruction, and services, local Christian Right organizations have stepped up efforts to oppose policies that would foster such reforms. Moreover, because reform efforts often advocate a broad range of sweeping changes in current practices, Christian Right organizations have succeeded in raising the fear of parents, teachers, and other community members against certain reforms. Christian Right organizations make a strong case that if reforms are passed, new teaching and assessment strategies will negatively effect students as well as parental efforts to influence their children's moral development (Arocha 1993; Kaplan 1994; Somerfield 1993).

To advance their own agendas, the Christian Right has targeted a variety of issues, such as school choice and home schooling, which allow students and their parents to use public funds to make private schooling choices. For instance, home schooling legislation seeks to provide home schooled children the opportunity to use public funds to purchase materials and gain access to ancillary school services. Christian activists also promote the issuance of vouchers to allow students to attend religious or independent schools with public funds. In both cases Christian parents are gaining the option to choose the school influence of their children with the benefit of public dollars. Thanks to the efforts of the Religious Right, these issues have been put before voters in several states across the country. In California, for instance, the CEE successfully collected signatures to place a school-choice referendum on the November 1993 ballot. The bill was narrowly defeated (Jones 1993; Arocha 1993).

Strategies of the Christian Right: Organizing Communities

Two overarching strategies undergird the Christian Right's efforts: (1) moving to a grass roots approach and (2) creating an effective infrastructure. In the late 1980s Christian Right leaders began recognizing the need to build up strong locally based, locally organized, and locally focused campaigns. Learning from its mistakes in the 1980s, the movement's leaders targeted efforts on developing grassroots strength in order to make full use of the democratic process. Moen notes (1992), "The move to the grassroots over time was a sagacious decision by Christian Right leaders. It placed their movement where it was likely to be most influential, because of the pressure that could be brought to bear on state and local officials" (p. 116). Moen also notes the efficacy of this strategy in that it deflected national attention (and often national criticism) away from the Christian Right organizations and its national leadership, taking them out of the spot light and enabling the movement to focus its energy on fighting more local and winnable battles.

How did the Christian Right facilitate so successfully this move to grassroots organizing? Part of the answer lies in its structural foundation. As noted in a previous section, the organizational structure of the Christian Right operates as a critically important infrastructure to the movement's effectiveness. The national organizations, such as CEE and the Christian Coalition, provide the technical expertise and act as the information nerve centers, while the local community affiliates provide the energy and the muscle to keep efforts flowing. Moreover, national organizations communicate amongst each other. Local chapters of the organizations have strong ties to their national headquarters. In addition, local chapters are well connected to their churches and other local conservative associations (Park 1987; Bradley 1992).

The movement's web-like structure provides a vital connection to information, idea sharing, and tactical support. First, the Christian Right uses its infrastructure web as an effective tool for information gathering and dissemination. It uses information to accomplish two vital objectives: to increase the expertise of its own ranks and to inform other Christians and non-Christian community members of important issues. For instance, Christian Right organizations dispense a variety of training materials to their local affiliates. The national offices of CWA, CEE, and the Christian Coalition provide a variety of "how-to" materials and training sessions to assist local affiliates in influencing policy decisions in the public schools. For a nominal fee, CEE provides its affiliates with a Public School Awareness Kit. The kit includes information about a wide variety of educational issues and action guides to organize petition drives and letter writing campaigns. In addition, the kit includes a guide written by Simonds entitled, How to Elect Christians to Public Office. Such assistance provides local affiliates with important expertise (Arocha 1993; Marzano 1993/94).

Once the organizations are in place and trained, they use a variety of powerful tactics to gain a stronghold in the community. Many local organizations mount extensive public awareness campaigns. Activists make speeches throughout the community to parents, church members, and other citizens. They use their networks to distribute pamphlets, newsletters, bumper stickers, and the like. They write editorials and letters to newspapers. In Pennsylvania such tactics proved to be too great for education reformers to combat. Local chapters of the CEE derailed a statewide school restructuring and reform effort, distributing videos to churches and parent organizations, producing thousands of copies of newsletters, and sponsoring a 900 telephone number to alert people to the latest protest dates (American School Board Journal 1993).

Another approach used quite successfully could be described as old-fashioned, in your face politicking: a strategy used to influence both elected officials and lay citizens. Local affiliates, with the assistance of their national organizations, identify local and state policy issues contrary to their beliefs. They dispatch activists to dominate discussions at school board meetings, to voice opinions at legislative or public hearings. In addition, school board candidates campaign door-to-door to garner support. Kaplan notes (1994), regarding Religious Right efforts to influence New York City school board elections, "The Christian Coalition unveiled tactics that were almost unheard of in New York City school politics—door-to-door solicitations, street- and precinct-level organization building, and the distribution of reams of materials . . ." (p. 4).

In addition to direct tactics, the Christian Right has made a careful assessment of the issues it addresses and the language it uses to convey its message. Again, based on its trial and error strategies of the 1980s, the movement has discovered that much of the American public does not resonate to passionate religious language. Moreover, many local affiliates, at the urging of national groups, are slowly moving their focus away from religiously charged issues such as creationism and sex-education to a more mainstream agenda focusing on academic achievement and teaching and learning strategies.

The Christian Right is learning on the national political scene that in order to be taken seriously, it must address the issues of most concern to the American voter. As such, Christian Right organizations have begun to push their local affiliates to focus on specific education reform strategies such as multicultural education, outcomes-based education, portfolio assessment, cooperative learning, integrated instruction, and other approaches. They focus on mainstream issues—often new and unfamiliar to parents—and provide arguments that strike at the core of many parents' concerns. For instance, they claim that new approaches mentioned above "intrude on parents rightful role" to shape a child's thinking and that such reforms "promote values established by the government rather than the family." Most often used is the argument that these new approaches will "divert scarce resources away from academics" (Jones 1993, p.24). While not all conservative Christian groups subscribe to this philosophy, the two organizations most powerful in the educational policy arena—CEE and the Christian Coalition—espouse this philosophy wholeheartedly. Notes Ralph Reed (1993), executive director of the Christian Coalition, "To win at the ballot box and in the legislative chambers, our movement is taking on the issues voters care about. We know that if we don't focus on specific policies to help families—tax cuts, education scholarships, higher wages—appeals to family values will fall on deaf ears" (p. 15).

In addition to changing issue focus, the Christian Right has made conscious efforts in recent years to moderate its rhetoric. This tactic has proved to be extremely effective in attracting new members and in gaining legitimacy amongst the masses. In fact, the language used by Christian activists is considered such an important aspect of political success that language workshops are held by leading groups. Notes one local chapter leader, "I have attended Christian-Right workshops at which group leaders coached people to employ nonsectarian rhetoric in the political arena so that non-fundamentalist Americans would not be frightened or turned off" (Moen 1992, p. 134). Gary Bauer, executive director of the Family Research Council, a conservative Christian organization, adds, "Today the [Christian Right] movement realizes that it must employ language that the American people feel comfortable with. If one does not use the words and phrases people are used to, one runs the risk of alienating them" (Moen 1992, p. 133). In addition, Christian Right leaders, direct their local leaders and members to make careful use of language. In its printed literature, Simonds cautions his local CEE chapters to discuss mainstream issues, avoid continual reference to the Bible and Christianity. In one of his guidance publications Simonds advises school board candidates to "be able to clearly explain why you believe what you do. Don't avoid religion, but don't come across 'all' religious." He goes on to say, "avoid saying 'kooky' things that may cause backlash" (Bradley 1992, p. 17).

Why Has the Christian Right Found Fertile Ground?

Failure to engage the public and build consensus around "expert" education reform strategies. Reformers have worked long and hard in developing new policies and practices to improve the achievement of children. What's more, educational experts and policy leaders have reached significant consensus around the changes needed in public education. Business organizations, corporate leaders, education experts and politicians on both sides of the aisle have championed strategies such as focusing on raising academic standards or replacing multiple choice tests with tests that require children to demonstrate their understanding of what they have learned (Cortes 1995; Johnson and Immerwahr 1994). Yet, a report of the Public Agenda Foundation notes, "Despite this extraordinary leadership consensus, progress has been disappointing" (Johnson and Immerwahr 1994, p. 7).

Given this backdrop, what accounts for such slow progress? In short, education reformers have done little work to build public support around new and somewhat complex notions. The education reform movement in many cases has been an elite-based reform movement. Reformers, corporate leaders, and supportive politicians have confined consensus building to the realm of expert opinion and leadership at the expense of understanding public concerns (Cortes 1995).

While reformers are working in an insular manner, the Christian Right is out in the community, shaping the issues of the discussion, defining the terms and concepts, and putting education reformers on the defensive. Kaplan (1994) notes, that "the religious right groups are not simply at the table, but rather they frequently set the agendas and dominate the debate" (p. K9). And because Christian activists have been successful at getting to the table first, they can get away with what some education reformers say is a distortion of the issues. It is important to note that many of the techniques espoused by education reformers, such as cooperative learning, portfolio assessment, and multicultural education are new. Most parents with children in the schools today have little or no experience with these curricular and instructional approaches. This lack of experience with the reform measures allows Christian activists to be vague in their explanations of reform measures as they often provide the first interpretation of the objectives of certain reforms.

A typical scenario may be described as follows. A small and committed group of educators develops a new strategy with the backing of the superintendent and school board, but in the process fails to adequately inform or seek the input of other affected publics including teachers, parents, and students. These reforms are often unclear, jargon laden and thus ripe for the redefinition and perhaps misinterpretation by others. In the case of Gastonia, North Carolina, referenced earlier, a teacher notes, "I think the opposition is basically based on lack of information about the program" (Somerfield p 19).

What's perhaps even more informative about the Gastonia case is that the school district did attempt to inform the community in some manner through presentations to business and civic groups as well as through the newspaper. The Christian Right succeeded in generating strong opposition and dissatisfaction in the community even in the face what was perceived by administrators as an adequate information campaign by the schools. What the Gastonia case suggests is the complexity of the change process and the need to cultivate real buy-in and support from a wide variety of publics—administrators, teachers, parents, and community. It implies that simply supplying the message without an opportunity for and openness to dialogue is an inadequate approach for building support.

Failure to understand the public and parental concerns: Research indicates that public concerns about education are insignificantly addressed through the reforms espoused by education leaders. According to the Public Agenda Foundation study, education reformers are out of sync with public concerns. Education reformers have not only failed to bring their issues to the public for discussion, but they have ignored the educational issues which pique public interest and concern. The study, which surveyed more than 1,100 citizens, found that the public is significantly more concerned with safe schools, drug free schools, and schools that teach basic skills than with the more complicated new ideas pushed by education reformers. What's more, parents not only have a different agenda than the reformers, but tend to be skeptical of new approaches advanced by the reform movement. The report notes, "Over all, the public seems to have a more traditional view of what should be happening in the classroom. People don't understand why these reforms are considered better, and people haven't been all that impressed with the reforms they have seen in the past" (Johnson and Immerwahr 1994, p. 17).

What's interesting to note is that in many cases the public tends to support underlying principals advanced by reformers, but not the strategies to achieve them. This indicates that education reformers have done a relatively poor job of communicating with the public and parents to educate them on the value and substance of new educational strategies. For instance the study revealed that most American's support the concept of "setting clear guidelines on what kids should learn and teachers should teach" (Johnson and Immerwahr 1994, p. 20) But they do not necessarily support approaches to accomplish these goals, such as new forms of testing and changes in the structure of the school day. New initiatives are often accompanied by a litany of jargon-ladden, "unfamiliar, poorly understood, newfangled. . . innovations" (p. 20). Thus, the public responds negatively to ideas that appear complicated and unexplained as they are unable to recognize that such ideas are meant to enhance mutually desired outcomes such as basic skills.

The Christian Right by contrast has recognized the need to tap into public concerns. As noted, the movement has been extremely adept in relating to certain community concerns and wants. Christian activists have determined that many parents are concerned about a safe environment, a curriculum that will get children into college, and shaping the beliefs of children at home not at school. As such, they focus on these issues when running for school board or refuting a reform policy. Additionally, because Christian Right activists are tapped into public concerns, they have been able to shape the discussion in such a way as to create fear. They have fueled their efforts by creating a climate of heightened concern and in some cases fear about reforms or the lack of discussion on basic skills and safety. Change as Fullan (1982) notes always brings uncertainty and the fear that one will be worse off than before. Because education reformers have in many cases done a poor job of communicating with its publics, it has left itself wide open to some of the tactics of the Christian Right to fuel these concerns.

Apathy of the Majority: A third important aspect of the Christian Right's success can be traced to the apathy of the majority of opinion holders. While Christian Right leaders are well aware of their minority status in numbers, they are not dissuaded by such reality. Among their most savvy approach is the recognition of majority apathy. As a result of such apathy particularly in low level local elections, Christian Right leaders have recognized that by mobilizing their supporters in large numbers, they are likely to be the majority of ballot casters. Fewer than 10 percent of registered voters usually cast a ballot for such elections, leaving the election vulnerable to a well organized minority.

Lutz's and Merz's (1992) dissatisfaction theory of democracy provides a theoretical base for understanding why Christian activists have been successful in their strategy of electing Christian school board candidates to office. According to the dissatisfaction theory, when changes in a community occur, a gap may develop between the values of the community and those of school leaders. If a community is dissatisfied enough by this gap, the community is more likely to rise up in opposition to the school leadership imposing the contrary values. Equally important, this theory notes, that if the community is not dissatisfied with the educational conditions, a situation of apathy or contentment with the status quo often results. Thus, in certain communities, the Christian Right has been successful in creating dissatisfaction among a core minority of voters. This core minority is successful in part because the majority is not dissatisfied with the reform efforts and as a result makes no movement to make its voice heard. Thus, the opinions being expressed at the school board meetings, at public hearings, and ultimately at the ballot box disproportionately represent the opinions of the minority. As such, the Christian activists are fully aware that their tactics need not pull in the majority of voters. Rather they are concerned with ensuring that a core minority is dissatisfied enough to vote and take a stand. It is clear that an active and forceful minority can make large waves in light of an apathetic or inactive majority that is not dissatisfied with current efforts.

Fighting Back: What Can Reformers Do?

At the heart of the Christian Right success is a sound commitment to public involvement. First, the Christian Right has recognized the importance of grass roots organizing and using the strength of community self-interest to accomplish its goals. Like the Right, education reformers must look to the local community for support. Rallying certain publics is perhaps an easier task for the Christian Right than reformers, as the Right relies in part on religious conviction as a unifying passion of its activists. But as noted, the Right also rallies many mainstream parents and community members through its secular focus on the needs of children—a strategy useful for reformers.

Next, they make excellent use of established institutions—churches and local affiliated organizations—to channel information and organize. While education reformers must tap into the strategy of using established institutions and networks, it has certain limitations. Unlike the Christian Right, reformers cannot rely on a specific organization such as the church to be the sole organizing base. Reformers have a more difficult task of forming coalitions with a variety of organizations. Bradley (1995) states, "Moderates and liberals can fight back by mobilizing support for public schools, but they will have to form new alliances to be successful" (p. 1). Such alliances might include PTAs, teachers' unions, librarian groups, women's groups. At the same time, it is important not to exclude the use of churches. Christians are not a monolithic group. Mainline Protestant churches and Catholic churches are potential allies. What's more, alliances with temples and mosques offer reformers another institutionalized base from which to work. Forming such alliances is tricky and does not provide the short-term quick mobilizations afforded to the Christian Right. Yet careful cultivation of such an alliance provides much broader and potentially long-term support unavailable to the Right. Additionally, as noted the Christian Right uses a host of national organizations to supply resources and provide training. Education reformers have certain national groups at their disposal as well, including national PTA organization, library groups, women's groups and the like. Furthermore, many of these groups have local affiliates and experience with grass roots organizing (Bradley 1995, Cortes 1995).

In addition, Christian Right political tactics offer education reformers an effective template. Their tactics incorporate a sound understanding of grass roots activism and rely on a strong infrastructure. Among the tactics that reformers must emulate include, distributing voter guides on education reform candidates, rallying supporters to attend public hearings and school board meetings. Importantly, reformers must develop literature or other mechanisms to provide parents and other publics with deeper explanation of reforms.

Thus, effective communication is a key part of the Christian Right strategy. They achieve their success in part by listening to and addressing parent concerns and in part by divising simple messages. Christian Right leaders shape their agenda to address parent concerns. Leaders of the Right take reports such as that from the Public Agenda seriously and use it to shape their messages. Education reformers must do the same. They cannot afford to cast aside public concerns; otherwise the Christian Right will continue to fill the void created by parental frustration with public schools.

Listening and interpreting is only one part of the equation. Education reformers must also learn how to communicate their ideas clearly and concisely. If they do not, the Christian Right will continue to define terms for reformers. Reforms are new and complicated and thus not easy to explain when attempting to do so fully and accurately. But reformers must diminish their use of jargon and communicate the bottom line outcomes desired. As noted, if reformers don't step up early and inclusively, the Christian Right is poised to take the helm.

To achieve its goals the Christian Right effectively uses a variety of negative strategies, including distortion of information and hidden agendas as well as feeding its activists information and opinions rather than educating them. While it might seem on the surface that there is little to gain from such strategies, they provide a useful touchstone in creating alternative approaches to engagement.

Foremost among such negative strategies is the Christian Right's use of distortion, and simplicity. Christian activists are content to offer simple and distorted explanations of reform strategies. Such definitions are shaped at the national level and fed to the grass roots levels as truisms. Rather than training activists to work with educators, to develop their own opinions around facts and create productive environments, they attempt to create anxiety and distrust among well meaning parents. Cortes (1995) notes, "Religious conservatives teach parents how to cast blame instead of how to craft well-reasoned critiques. Their coalitions offer simplistic solutions to complicated questions of public education reform" (p. 1).

By contrast if reformers hope to create long-term success they cannot rely on fear, blame, and inaccuracy. Cortes offers an important model in that of the Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF) approach. Cortes suggests that we must truly engage parents in a deliberative process about the needs of schools and children. This engagement he asserts must emanate from established community institutions. It must teach parents and educators to become engaged and educate themselves on issues. Cortes (1995) notes, "When parents and community members are truly engaged . . . they initiate action, collaborating with educators to implement ideas for reform" (p. 1). Thus, at the core of the IAF approach is sustained public engagement, undergirded by education and knowledge. Unlike the Christian Right approach, IAF provides its activists with the training and tools to study issues and to make careful informed decisions.

The IAF model also provides evidence that churches are not simply the province of the Right. The model relies heavily on churches as the main established institutions in which to organize. In recent years however, to impact education it has also reached out to PTAs, teachers' unions, and to schools themselves as established institutions within which to build consensus. In some ways the IAF model can be seen as a preventative approach. Christian Right logic cannot permeate IAF thinking as coalitions are well developed and built around trust and critical thinking.

The IAF's work in Southwest Texas provides a concrete example. Sixty schools in 12 cities have formed an umbrella known as the "Alliance Schools Initiative." Alliance schools have made a public commitment to fully collaborate with parents and community members to improve student achievement. With the help of professional organizers, schools, parents, and community members have learned how to engage in one-on-one conversations about their concerns and desires. They learn to ask important questions of each other and how to rally less engaged parents and teachers. What's more, they hold each other accountable for a shared set of goals. Through close relationship building and time, teachers and school staff learn what is most important to parents and parents learn how innovative approaches can help their children.

Such a consensus building approach is even more critical for reformers than the Christian Right. The Right is most often fighting against an issue rather than the more difficult task of swaying opinion to new and untraditional modes of operation. As a result, reformers must recognize the need to address not only their own curricular and pedagogical interests, but also the broad concerns of parents around education and schools. This is certainly a scary step. Engaging in this type of activity means that not all reform efforts will work. In some cases, parents' concerns over issues such as basic skills may override reformers efforts. But forward movement depends on trust and give and take.

Taking back the schools

Outraged by this act of hubris, an informal group of parents began to meet in living rooms to discuss how to oppose the board. Meetings accelerated to weekly events. Quickly the parents realized that in order to have an impact they needed to create a formal organization and increase their ranks. As a result, they founded "People for Mainstream Values" (PMV). The mission of the group was clear. PMV was to become a nonpartisan coalition committed to unseating the Religious Right majority. The group endorsed both Republican and Democratic candidates in the primaries, sent out literature to voters throughout the counties, wrote editorials in the newspapers, and provided small funding to candidates. What's more the group organized a volunteer army of over 100 committed activists. When primary election ended, success was in the air. PMV was victorious. All the candidates it had endorsed, both Republican and Democrat, had made it to the general election. The general election would be free from Christian Right candidates.

The dissatisfaction theory of democracy helps us to understand the activities in Lake County. When a core group of parents were finally pushed to a point of extreme dissatisfaction they took action and reengaged. This reengagement is significant and can be seen in a variety of ways. In Lake County, prior to the election of the Christian Right board members, few citizens attended board meetings. Within three years of Pat Hart's election, more than 100 people turned out regularly to meetings. And attendance at particularly controversial meeting soared into the many hundreds. Voter turnout increased dramatically as well. Almost 40 percent of registered voters cast ballots in the school board primaries—well above the average turnout of seven percent. When dissatisfaction reached a critical mass, opposition formed. And in the case of Lake County with significant success.

The trend in Lake County is observable in other communities. A similar scenario can be documented in San Diego, where in 1990 the Christian Right held a majority of the School Board seats. This is no longer the case. Mainstream candidates are again in the majority. In more and more communities where apathy was once the norm regarding education, Christian Right dominance has led to an increase in political participation of its citizens. Like in Lake County, board meetings that once went unattended are now overflowing with parents concerned about the direction of the schools. And more groups are organizing and turning out votes.

While the presence of the Christian Right continues to influence many communities, an important question to explore further is, can the Christian Right sustain its power in the community over the long term? Once its agenda becomes more clear on school boards or in policy shaping, will the mainstream public support a Christian Right agenda? Moreover, will the public organize in opposition? The case of Lake County seems to suggest that the public is not willing to support the Right in the long term. Once the deeper conservative views of the Christian Right controlled board emerged, even conservative Lake County became alarmed. Diamond (1995) notes that voters in Lake County, by ousting the Christian Right board members, proved "that it [is] easier to win short-term office than maintain power indefinitely" (p. 301). Time and further research is needed to answer such questions.

It is critical, however, to recognize that for education reformers to be successful, they must be proactive. They cannot continue to overlook the bottom-line public concerns of basic skills and safety. Nor can they continue to remain removed from public engagement and decision input. If reformers insist on an insular process, success will be limited. Cortes' (1995) words are perhaps encouraging for the future: "educators are beginning to realize that without the support and engagement of the parents and community leaders at the grass roots level, any attempts at improving the public schools will be ineffective" (p. 2).

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